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Impact of Leverage on Earning Management Empirical Evidence from Manufacturing Sector of Pakistan  Aysha Asim Department of Business Administration, Virtual University of Pakistan MA Jinnah Campus, Defence Road, Off Raiwind Road, Lahore  Abstract The current study examines the impact of leverage on earning management in manufacturing sector of Pakistan. It selects the list of 159 non financial firms from Pakistan stock exchange for the time period from 2009 to 2015. The study has used Modified Jones Model 1995 as a proxy of earning management. Independent variable includes leverage along with three control variables i.e. growth, firm size and return on assets. The findings reveal that there is significant positive relationship between leverage and earning management activities while other variables of the firm i.e. return on assets and firm size were also found to be significant, whereas no significant relationship was found between growth and earning management activities. This study has also discussed the relationship between earning management and discretionary accruals.  Implications of the study for different stakeholders have also been discussed.  Keywords: Earning Management, Discretionary Accruals, Leverage, Non-Discretionary Accruals.  Introduction Accounting system offers some gaps/opportunities to interfere in financial statements to show the anticipated profit figure to the stakeholders.  Earning management has been defined on many ways. According to Schipper (1989), Earning management is intentional interference in financial statements in order to gain some personal or organizational benefits. Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen (2015) defined earning management is a process of manipulation in financial reporting to gain some potential benefits for organization. In simple words, earning management is the manipulation of financial statements to get the desired level of earnings in order to meet shareholder’s expectations or to attain some organizational benefits. However, earning management is not always linked with manipulation of accounting data but more associated towards selecting an accounting procedure within limits of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) (Veronica, 2015). Earning management was initiated in last years due to large corporate scandals in Europe  and U.S e.g. Enron, WorldCom and Xerox (Goncharov, 2005). There are two techniques of earning management i.e. Accrual based earning management (AEM), and real earning management (REM). AEM is the manipulation in financial reporting procedures within GAAP( generally accepted accounting principles) whereas real earning management is deviation in real transactions of normal business practices (Roychowdhury, 2006). During last years significant research has been done in accrual based and real earning management. Different techniques and approaches have been developed and adopted to measure earning management i.e use of discretionary accruals and income distributions (Dilger & Graschitz, 2015). According to Dechow and Skinner (2000), accrual based earning management is the most common tool to measure the earning quality as it involves general accounting procedures.   Literature Review and Hypothesis development  Earning has a long history; it has been highlighting on circumstances in which earning management is practicing and consequences of earning management behavior. Some earlier studies had focused on selecting accounting methods and choice of accounting tools as a proxy of earning management (Cahan, 1992; DeAngelo, 1988; Dechow & Dichev, 2002; Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 1995; Jones, 1991).  Many studies in literature have used accruals as a proxy of earning management whereas there are also some studies that are based on real earning management technique. Bruns Jr and Merchant (1990) identified that managers are more involved in real earning management activities than accrual based earning management as real earning management is difficult to detect as it involves manipulation in real transactions. But according to Healy (1985) and Dechow and Skinner (2000), accrual based earning management is most important tool in earning management. Past studies have used different methods in accrual based earning management field. But the most powerful tool to measure earning management has been  the use of discretionary accruals i.e. Modified Jones Model (Dechow et al., 1995). In 1991, Jones (1991) introduced a model to measure the discretionary accruals as a measure of earning management that was further modified by (Dechow et al., 1995) to eliminate the conjecture propensity of Jones  Model 1991 to calculate the discretionary accruals with the error when managers use their judgment over revenues.  Significant research exists on the association between financial leverage and earning management based on accrual based and real earning management techniques. There exist two different aspects in explaining the 
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relationship between leverage and earning management. Some past studies suggest that leverage increase the prospective for managers to manage earnings to evade debt covenant cost. Sweeney (1994) provide direct proof to support the hypothesis that high debt levels induce the managers to select income increasing accounting procedures. Literature also reveals that managers manipulate income in order to portray strong financial position and firms with high debt level are more involved in earning management activities in order to avoid from reporting loss (Burgstahler & Dichev, 1997; Degeorge, Patel, & Zeckhauser, 1999; Waweru & Riro, 2013). Positive association between leverage and earning management can also be evidence with the financial distressed theory explained by (Fung & Goodwin, 2013). This study inspected the impact of debt on earning management in financial distressed firms; results showed that there is positive link  earning management and between short term debt in financial distressed firms. Ujah and Brusa (2011) also inspected the impact of cash flow volatility and financial leverage on accrual based earning management activities. This study identified that both cash flow volatility and  leverage affect the degree to which firms control their earnings, moreover customer staples and consumer cyclical groups are more involved in earning management activities.  Although significant literature have revealed the positive linkage between financial leverage and earning management but still there are some evidences of studies with opposite view. Iturriaga and Hoffmann (2005) identified the negative link between leverage and accrual based earning management on the basis that managers of high leveraged firms are less involved in earning manipulation because creditors are more concerned in debt services than any other accounting information.  Although extended literature has been found on earning management in Pakistan e.g. (Haider, Ali, & Sadiq, 2012; Naz, Bhatti, Ghafoor, & Husein, 2011; Tabassum, Kaleem, & Nazir, 2014; Tahir, Sabir, & Shah, 2011) but the effect of leverage on earning management is still pending for investigation. This study contributes the continuing debate on the relationship between leverage and accrual based earning management in manufacturing sector of Pakistan.  Based on the above arguments, the following hypotheses were constructed: H1o= Financial Leverage has no significant affect on the Accrual Based Earning Management H1i= Financial Leverage has significant affect on the Accrual Based Earning Management H2o = Firm size has no impact on the Accrual Based Earning Management H2i = Firm size has an impact on the Accrual Based Earning Management H3o = Return on Assets has no impact on the Accrual Based Earning Management H3i= Return on Assets has an impact on the Accrual Based Earning Management H4o = Firm growth has no impact on the Accrual Based Earning Management H4i = Firm growth has an impact on the Accrual Based Earning Management.   Research Methodology  This study has selected 159 non-financial firms that are listed on Pakistan Stock Exchange from major four sectors i.e. textiles, cement, chemical & pharmacy and other manufacturing companies for the period from 2009 to 2015. All Financial firms were excluded due to their different capital structure and accounting practices. Data was gathered from annual reports published on official websites and also from “financial statement analysis of non-financial firms listed on Pakistan Stock Exchange”. Data was collected on the basis of availability of consecutive years. Modified Jones Model (Dechow et al., 1995) has been used as a measure of accrual based earning management and panel data analysis techniques have been used by Stata software.  This study uses the earning management as dependent variable and leverage as independent variable along with three control variables i.e. return on assets (roa), firms growth (growth) and firm size.  On the basis of literature review, theoretical framework of research study is as follows:- Figure 1: Theoretical Framework 
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Measuring Dependent Variable Earning Management  Based on the literature, this study uses the proxy of discretionary accruals to measure earning management. To measure discretionary accruals Modified Jones Model (Dechow et al., 1995) was used. The Modified Jones model to calculate the non discretionary part of accruals is as follows:- NDACC / Ait-1= β1j [1/Ait-1] + β2j (∆ REV/ Ait-1 - ∆ REC it) / TA it -1 + β3j (PPE it / Ait-1)         Eq (1) Where: NDACC= Non-Discretionary accruals At-1= Total assets for the period t-1 ∆REV = Change in revenue  ∆REC= Change in the values of account receivables from last year PPE = Property Plant and equipment (gross, operating fixed assets at cost) In order to use the specific parameters of firm in above equation the following equation was used in regression.  TACCt/Ait-1 = β1j [1/Ait-1] + β2j [(∆REVit – ∆ARit)]/ Ait-1 + β3j [PPEit/ Ait-1] + εit    Eq(2) Wherein,  total accruals (TACC) can be calculated through balance sheet approach i.e.  TACC= (∆CA −∆CASH −∆CL + ∆STDEBT − DEPN)      Where TACC  total accruals  ∆CA  change in current assets  ∆CL  change in current liabilities  ∆CASH  change in cash in hand  ∆STDEBT  change in short term debt  DEPN   depreciation   To measure the non-discretional accrual amount, specific amounts of firm for each independent variable are employed for each period industry wise based on the fact that each variable (TAC/Ait-1, ∆REVit – ∆ARit, PPEit/ Ait-1) is coming from same firm with each dataset being from different time period. Once β1j, β2j, β3j have been measured for the cross section of the firms for the period from 2009 to 2015 through above regression equation (Eq 2), these coefficients are added in Eq (1) to calculate non-discretionary accrual part of firms Discretionary accruals (DACC) are then calculated by taking difference of total accruals (TACC) and non -discretionary accrual (NDACC) which is the proxy of accrual based earning management.  DACC = TACC-NDACC All the variables in the regression model are standardized by total assets (t-1) to remove the problem of size effect of firm.   Measurement of Independent Variables  Main independent variable in this study is leverage. Leverage is defined as use of long term to finance firm’s assets. Companies with more long term debts are considered to be high leveraged. Leverage was measured through debt ratio i.e total debts/ total assets.  Other control variables were also measured as follows:- Return on assets  Net income/Average total assets  Firm Size   Natural log of total assets  Sale growth   percentage change in sales  Finally, the following regression model is employed  to test the relationship of leverage along with control variables on earning management.  DACCit = α0 + β1 Levit+ β2 sales growth it + β3Size it + β4ROAit + εit  Results  Data analysis starts with descriptive statistics followed by correlation and then final regression results are shown and discussed to test the validity of hypothesis. Stata software was used for regression analysis.  1- Descriptive Statistics Descriptive analysis shows the minimum, mean, maximum, and standard deviation values of variables. Highest value of discretionary accruals of 2.7475 show positive discretionary accrual also called abnormal accruals which indicate that sample firms are engaged in income increasing accrual management. Average value of leverage (0.42) show a significant level of debt financing in capital structure with standard deviation of 0.30 which means that financial leverage represent about 42% of total assets from sampled firms.  
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Table 1:  Descriptive Statistics Descriptive Statistics Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max DACC 1133 0.0094535 0.3126321 -2.4063 2.7475 Leverage 1133 0.4216679 0.309455 0.000 3.5667 Roa 1133 0.0296482 0.1563653 -1.6431 3.1953 Growth 1133 0.1830255 1.54675 -4.5356 36.1123 Firm Size 1133 8.510105 0.7118137 6.6127 11.5626 Note: DACC represents the discretionary accruals; Leverage represents the debt ratio i.e. .total debt/total assets; Roa represents the return on total assets; Growth represents the percentage change in growth; firm size represents the natural log of total assets. 2- Correlation Analysis  Correlation analysis is most common and useful tool to test the strength of connection between dependent and independent variables. It also helps to check the multi collinearity problem in the dataset. Pearson Correlation is the most common measure of correlation in statistics. It explains the linear relationship and degree of correlation between independent variables (Pearson, 1895). Its value ranges between +1 and -1, where +1 means high positive correlation and -1 means total negative linear correlations. Pearson’s correlation less than 0.80  between independent variables prove no multi collinearity between variables  (Bassiouny, Soliman, & Ragab, 2016; Soliman, 2013). Table 2 gives the correlation matrix results between independent variables. According to the results  no multi collinearity exist  among all  independent variables as all the coefficients are less than 0.80.Highest correlation can be seen between return on assets and discretionary accruals.  Table 2: Correlation Matrix Correlation Analysis DACC Leverage Roa Growth Firm size DACC 1 leverage .0600 1 ROA .2936 -.1551 1 Growth .0676 -.0277 .0628 1 Firm Size .1373 -.2293 .0922 .0385 1 Note: DACC represents the discretionary accruals; Leverage represents the debt ratio i.e. .total debt/total assets; Roa represents the return on total assets; Growth represents the percentage change in growth; firm size represents the natural log of total assets.   Final Regression  Hausman test was carried out for the sampled data which suggest random effect model to be used instead of fixed effect model. Diagnostic test have also been applied which shows that dataset has hetroskedasticity and autocorrelation problem but free from multi collinearity. To ensure the reliability and validity and of statistical results, this study has used the panel data regression to adjust the standard errors to adjust the standard errors of coefficients against possible dependence in the residuals. Robust standard errors are widely accepted and common to rely in case of any violation to get the valid statistical regression results (Hoechle, 2007). Table 3 gives the results of random effect model with cluster id.  Table 3: GLS Random Effect Regression Results with Robust standard errors DACC Coef. Std. Error z P>z Leverage .145738 .0384978   3.79 0.000 Roa .6157207 .0716696 8.59 0.000 Growth .0103945 .0102269 1.02 0.309 firm size - .0622892 .0197205   3.16 0.002 _cons   -.602245   .164567   -3.66 0.000 No. of observations  1113   No. Of groups 159 R-squared 37.47%    Wald chi2(4)         102.30       Prob > chi2         0.000 Note: DACC represents the discretionary accruals; Leverage represents the debt ratio i.e. .total debt/total assets; Roa represents the return on total assets; Growth represents the percentage change in growth; firm size represents the natural log of total assets The regression model was resulted to be highly significant because significance level is at 0.000. R-square 
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of the study is 37.47% which is good enough and it is also consistent with the previous studies such as  Aman, Pourjalali, and Teruya (2006) Zamri, Rahman, and Isa (2013), Abbadi, Hijazi, and Al-Rahahleh (2016) and Briamonte, Addeo, Fiano, and Sorrentino (2017). Results show that leverage is positively and significantly effect the  accrual based earning management which means that increased leverage induce the managers to manipulate the earnings in upward directions. The results are also consistent with previous studies i.e. (Bassiouny et al., 2016; Ujah & Brusa, 2014; Uwuigbe, Uwuigbe, & Bernard, 2015; Vakilifard & Mortazavi, 2016). From control variables, return on assets and firm size are also found significant and positively related with accrual based earning management similar to the studies of (Moradi, Salehi, & Najari, 2012; Nassir Zadeh, Salehi, & Alaei, 2012). However, growth was not found to be significant enough to have any relationship with accual based earning management similar to the results  of Collins, Pungaliya, and Vijh (2016). Another approach to deal with hetroskedasticity and autocorrelation in panel data is Park’s Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) estimators. Though, it can be employed only when number the number of cross sections (N) is less than or equal to of time periods (T). So, Beck and Katz (1995) reported the customized version of inefficient least squares (OLS) which is known as “Panel Correlated Standard Errors (PCSE). PCSE estimator significantly performs better than FGLS estimators in many conditions (Reed & Ye, 2011). In STATA pooled OLS regression with panel correlated standard errors can be calculated with xtpcse command. Xtpcse command computes the panel correlated standard error for the data of cross sectional time series models where the parameters are estimated by OLS or Paris –Winston regression. In calculating the robust standard errors estimates , xtpcse command supposes that disturbance are by default hetroskedastic and correlated across panels (Hoechle, 2007). So, PCSE estimators have been widely adopted. Application of these estimators can be found in many past studies (Bitzer & Stephan, 2007; Lago-Peñas, 2006; Marques, 2005; Mosca 1, 2007). The results of PCSE has been reported in annexure I as table 4.  Conclusion  This study has inspected the effect of leverage on accrual based earning management in 159 non –financial firms listed on PSX (Pakistan Stock Exchange) for the period from 2009 to 2015. Earning management is taken as dependent variable and leverage as independent variable along with three control variables i.e. growth, firm size, and return on asset. Based on regression results it was found that debt ratios i.e. leverage has positive association with accrual based earning management which means that high level motivates the managers to involve in earning management either to report desired profit level or to gain certain organizational goals. This gives the signals to the firms to control the debt level to avoid manipulations in earnings. The findings of this research will be helpful for future researchers who wish conduct further research in the area of earning management.    Limitations & Recommendations This study also lacks some limitations which can be considered by future researchers. First, this study has used only one model i.e. Modified Jones Model 1995 as a proxy to earning management. Other models in literature can also used to find the trade off between two. Secondly, this used overall analysis of different sectors from non-financial firms; sector wise analysis can also be a major contribution in the area of earning management. Further, more control variables may also be added to extend the scope of study to get better results.  Based on the study results, it would be recommended to the firms to control their debt level to reduce the manipulation in accrual management. Higher debt level increases the monitoring of financial analysts and other stakeholders could also be subject to scrutinized earning management activities. Results of the study also have an inference for investors, auditors, investors and regulators. High debt level of firms can be a signal to the investors for having manipulated earnings. So, it is recommended to examine the financial statement carefully before making any investment decision. Auditors and regulators can also increase regulations to control accrual based earning management. 
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